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The Indemnity and Compensation Act, No. 45 o f 1975, came into  
e ffe c t on 3rd October 1975, i t s  main objects being to indemnify 
members o f  the security forces in respect, o f  acts done in good 
fa ith  fox' the suppression o f  terrorism and to enable members o f 
the public to obtain compensation in  respect o f such acts without 
waiting for the end o f  h o s tili t ie s .
The author shortly surveys the events leading up to the 
passing o f the Act, the relevant provisions o f  the common law and 
the legislation i t s e l f .  He then puts forward a number o f c r i t i ­
cisms, especially .drawing attention to the undesirability o f 
excluding the jurisd iction  o f the courts.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ACT
Incursions by African nationalist te rro ris ts  into Rhodesia 
commenced about 1964. Since that time there has been continued terrorist 
ac tiv ity  a t d iffering levels of in tensity . The success of the te rro ris ts  
has largely been dependent upon winning the support and co-operation of 
the local African population in the areas in which they have operated. 
Where co-operation has not been forthcoming, methods of violent intim i­
dation have been resorted to . Ch the other hand the Rhodesian security 
forces have also been heavily dependent upon the co-operation of the 
resident population for the success of th e ir counter-insurgency campaign. 
No declared s ta te  of warfare exists between two sovereign independent 
sta tes in th is conflic t. The conflict could almost be categorised as a 
c iv il war insofar as many of the African te rro r is ts  are Rhodesians who 
have le f t  the country and have been trained in te r ro r is t  tac tics  outside 
Rhodesia. Although there has been a continual declared s ta te  of emer­
gency in Rhodesia since before 11th November 1965,1 no proclamation of 
martial law has been made during th is time. I t  is  arguable, however, 
tha t the passing of the indemnity leg isla tion  is  tantamount to a declara­
tion that martial law ex ists , a t least in certain  areas of Rhodesia.
This question w ill be considered iri more detail la te r . Prior to the 
indemnity leg islation  the escalating te r ro r is t  situation  had led to the 
passing of a considerable number of stringent measures, including the 
proclamation of several curfews over large trac ts of land. Throughout, 
the Rhodesian Government has maintained the a ttitu d e  that th e-te rro ris ts  
were' nothing more than common criminals. The campaign to combat 
terrorism has therefore been treated  by Government as essentially  a
1. In  th e  t e n  y e a r s  im m e d ia te ly  p r e c e d in g  U .D .I . th e r e  w ere s i x
d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e s  o f  em ergency , e a c h  o f  t h r e e  months* d u ra ­
t i o n .  A new s t a t e  o f  em ergency h a s  b e en  c o n t in u a l ly  renew ed s in c e  
th e n ,  th e  1969 C o n s t i tu t i o n  p r o v id in g  f o r  an  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  p e r io d  
o f  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  em ergency from  th r e e  m onths to  one y e a r .
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policing operation with the m ilitary merely assisting  in. th is police 
action.
In April 197S the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace pub­
lished a booklet en titled  The Man in the Middle. Inter alia  th is 
publication made allegations that there was a body of evidence of 
torture and assaults and destruction of property by members of the 
Rhodesian security forces directed against' innocent civ ilians in certain 
tr ib a l areas of Rhodesia. These ac ts, i t  was alleged, were committed 
with the intention of extracting information about the movement of 
te rro r is ts  or of intimidating the populace to co-operate with the 
security forces. These allegations, and others of a sim ilar nature, 
were to ta lly  refuted by the Government. The Government rejected the 
ca ll for an independent enquiry into these allegations, stating that . 
persons alleging to have been injured by such actions had the perfectly 
adequate remedy of pursuing th e ir grievances in the ordinary courts. In 
fact categorical statements were made at th is  time by senior members of 
Government that the courts would always remain open to such persons to 
a ir  th e ir  grievances. In line with these indications a number of c iv il  
claims were commenced in the High Court by persons alleging to have been 
injured in these circumstances. Some months la te r , however, the 
Indemnity and Compensation Act was passed by Parliament despite a report 
by the Senate Legal Committee that i t  was inconsistent with the Declara­
tion of Rights. Apparently the main reason for th is  change of approach 
on the part o f the Government was that i t  was fe lt  that pending court 
actions were "being brought with the intention of undermining, denigrating 
and demoralising the security forces and i f  these and other actions were 
allowed to be brought they would hinder the security forces in the per­
formance of th e ir task , as under threat of litig a tio n  they might be 
reluctant to take action clearly ju s tif ie d  by the m ilitary situation. 
Speaking in support of th is  leg islation  Advocate Andersen S.C. , M.P. 
contended that the indemnity afforded by the leg islation  " . . .  may 
well be argued to already ex ist a t the common law."2 3 I t  was further 
argued tha t th is leg isla tion  would allow persons injured by bona fide  
wrongdoing to be compensated immediately, whereas under the conmon law 
the courts would lack ju risd ic tion  to award compensation in respect of 
in juries incurred in “time of war.
THE COMMON LAW POSITION
/>
The conmon law position in England, South Africa and Rhodesia 
appears to be as follows:
(i) "When a s ta te  of war or of insurrection, r io t  or rebellion 
amounting to  war exists [a Government] may use the amount of force 
necessary in the circumstances to restore order. This use of force 
is  sometimes termed 'm artial law’ ."3 a formal proclamation of 
martial law does not have to be made for martial law to exist.
2 . Hdnsard, 2 8 th  A ugust 1975 , p .  1495, c o l . l .
3. Halsbury's Laws o f  England ( 4 th  e d . ) ,  v o l . 8 . , p .9 8 1 .
i
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"The righ t to administer force against force in actual war does 
not depend upon the proclamation of.m artial law a t a l l .  It- depends 
on the question whether there is  war or not."4 5 "A proclamation 
of martial law is  merely a notification  to  a l l  concerned that the 
righ t in  question is  about to pe exercised and along certain 
l in e s ."5 " I t  is  merely an indication to a l l  c iv ilians, so far
as they may have been in any doubt, a s 'to  what condition does in 
fact p revail."6 7
( ii)  When "a s ta te  of actual war exists the c iv il courts have no 
authority to ca ll in question the actions of the m ilitary authori­
t ie s ,  but i t  is  fo r the courts to decide, i f  th e ir  ju risd iction  is 
invoked, whether a s ta te  of war exists which ju s tif ie s  the appli­
cation of martial law."7
( i i i )  "The powers, such as they are, o f the m ilitary authorities 
cease and those of the c iv il courts are resumed ipso facto with 
the termination of the s ta te  of war, and, in the absence of an Act 
of Indemnity, the c iv il  courts may inquire into the legality  of 
anything done during the s ta te  of war. Even i f  there is  an Act 
of Indemnity couched in the usual terms, malicious acts w ill not 
be permitted."8
The courts have sought to ju s tify  th is common law position on the 
basis th a t to open m ilitary operations to challenge in  the courts while 
was is  raging might hamper such operations very seriously and where the 
safety of the State is  a t  stake no obstacle should be placed in the path 
of those seeking to restore order.
There is  no clear guidance in the case law as to how extensive or 
widespread the conditions of war, rebellion or insurrection must be 
before the stage is  reached when the courts would be bound to decline 
ju risd ic tion  over the actions of the m ilitary. In the case of Ex parte 
D.F.. Marais [1902] A.C. 109 the court stated:
"Doubtless cases of d ifficu lty  arise  when the fact of a s ta te  of 
rebellion or insurrection is  not clearly  established. I t  may 
often be a question whether a mere r io t ,  or disturbance neither 
so serious or so extensive as really  to amount to a war at a l l ,  
has not been trea ted  with excessive severity, and whether the 
intervention of the m ilitary force was necessary . . .".
There is  d ifficu lty  in the Rhodesian context in  describing the 
nature and extent of the conflic t. There is  no declared s ta te  of war- 
fare between two warring factions. The te rro r is ts  aie not conducting
4 . Tilcnko v. A. G. for Natal [1907] A.C. 93 a t  94 .
5 .  Krohn v. Minister o f  Defence and Others, 1915 A. D. 197 .
6 . A ndersen  in  Hansard, 2 8 th  A u g u st 1975 , p .  1493 , c o l , 2 .
7 . Halsbury's Laws o f  England, loo. o it.
8 . " Halsbury's Laws o f England, loc. a it.
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a conventional war, but are adopting guerilla  s ty le  tac tics . As the 
then Minister of Justice and Law and Law and Order has pointed out9 the 
te rro r is t campaign is  a continuing thing and no end to i t  is  in sight.
The only end from the te rro r is t standpoint is  the overthrow of the white- 
minority Government. The te r ro r is t  campaign is  localised, although the 
areas in which th e ir a c tiv itie s  are concentrated are very extensive.
The in tensity  of th e ir  ac tiv itie s  has fluctuated considerably over the 
years from very l i t t l e  ac tiv ity  to re la tively  large in filtra tio n s . They 
have tended to avoid' d irect confrontation with the security forces, 
apart from occasional ambushes, and have rather attacked white farm 
dwellings, la id  landmines, e tc. They have conducted a campaign of 
violence against the local African c iv ilian  population to force co­
operation.
I t  would seem, however, that i t  could.be argued that an actual 
s ta te  of war has existed in the operational areas in Rhodesia since the 
commencement of te rro r is t in filtra tio n s  in 1964, or at least since the 
s ta r t  of the in tensified  campaign in 1972. I t  has been contended that 
the common law ruling that the courts lack ju risd ic tion  in respect of 
m ilitary ac tiv itie s  during an actual war can extend to areas other than 
where h o s ti li t ie s  are actually taking place for the time being.10 
Pollock argues in  (1902) 18 L.Q.B. a t p.156 th a t
"The range of the acts must extend to the prevention of aid  and 
comfort to the enemy beyond the bounds of places where warlike 
operations are in  sight. In many places there may actually be 
peace and yet modem means of communicating may admit of important 
aid  being conveyed to the enemy in the shape of information, 
supplies and personal adherence."
THE INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION ACT ^
This Act applies to  proceedings in the courts against the Govern­
ment or any Government servant or any person acting under the direction 
or with the approval of the Government, and i t  applies both to proceedings 
already pending and those that may be in stitu ted  in the future; Ihe Act 
has retrospective e ffec t and applies to  actions done from 1st Deceuber, 
1972.
The Act provides tha t no c iv il or criminal proceedings may be 
in s titu ted  or continued in  any court of law against the State, i t s  
employees or i t s  appointees in respect of acts done in good fa ith  whilst 
acting for the purpose of, or in connection with, the suppression of 
terrorism  or maintenance of public ordeT. A written ce rtifica te  by the 
Minister that the act was done for the simpression of terrorism is  
deemed to be conclusive proof in any court of law that the act was done 
for th is  purpose. The Minister can issue th is c e rtifica te  acting alone 
without reference to  the President or the Executive Council. Thus no 
court could question the c e r tif ic a te , even i f  i t  could be proved that
9 . Hansard, 2 8 th  A ugust 1975 , p .1 4 3 4 , c o l . 2 .
10. See f o r  i n s t a n c e  Elphinstone v. Bedseeahund (1830) 1 Knapp. P .C .316.
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the act in question had nothing whatsoever to do with the suppression of 
terrorism. The claimant is  given no righ t to s ta te  his side o'f the 
story before the ce rtifica te  is  issued. There is  no definition of the 
terms "good fa ith", "terrorism" or "public order*'.
C ivil or criminal proceedings already in stitu ted  can be terminated 
by a sligh tly  d ifferent procedure. The President acting on the advice 
of the Executive Council can authorise the Minister to issue a c e r t i f i ­
cate terminating such proceedings i f  he decides that the act was done by 
the State, i t s  employees or appointees in good fa ith  for the purposes of, 
o r  in connection with, the suppression of terrorism  or the maintenance 
of public order and that i t  is  in the national in te re st that such pro­
ceedings shall not be continued. The President makes th is decision 
.having regard to a fu ll report by the Minister, setting  out the circum­
stances in which the act took place and the factors showing that the 
conditions se t out in the Act were present. Whilst the Minister can 
make th is report there is  no provision for any claimant, to make any 
representations to the President or to the Minister to state  his side 
of the story. The Minister has the righ t to make th is  report even 
though the legal proceedings are against himself. The Government alone 
decides what constitutes "good fa ith " , action necessary to suppress 
terrorism or in connection with the suppression of terrorism, "public 
order", and "national interest'!. The courts are prohibited from ques­
tio n in g  the valid ity  of any ce rtif ic a te  issued. Review jurisd iction  
of the courts is  expressly excluded. No reasons for the issuing of 
the ce rtif ica te  need be given.
When proceedings are terminated by the issue of a c e rtif ic a te , the 
courts are prohibited from ordering the legal costs already incurred by 
the claimants to be paid by the Government, even i f  the Government's 
defence has been made in bad fa ith  or is  frivolous or vexatious. But 
i f  the claimant has acted frivolously or vexatiously, the court may order 
him to pay the Government's costs. I f  the claimant has not been frivo­
lous or vexatious, he must pay his own costs and the Government must pay 
i ts  own costs. -
Criminal prosecutions which have been commenced or those in stitu ted  
in  the future can be terminated by means of the same procedure, even i f  
the prosecution has been in stitu ted  by a State Prosecutor or by the 
Attorney-General. Moreover i f  the prosecution is terminated, the 
accused is en titled  to be acquitted.
The court i t s e l f  is  bound to terminate any proceedings before i t ,  
even i f  no M inisterial ce rtifica te  has been issued, i f  the court is of 
the opinion that such proceedings should not have been in stitu ted  
because the injury arose out of bona fide  action to suppress terrorism 
or to maintain public order.
Where proceedings were pending on 3rd October 1975 and these are 
. germinated, the Minister is  obliged to re fer the claim to a Compensation 
Board. But i f  the proceedings are in stitu ted  a f te r  3rd October 1975 
the Minister is  under, no obligation to re fer the claim to the Compensa­
tion Board, but may do so in his discretion. Again i t  should be noted 
that the Minister w ill often be the person against whom the claim is
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made. Where a person wishes to pursue a claim which has been stopped 
before the courts, he must write to  the Minister setting  out fully  the 
grounds on which he is  claiming and also the extent of injury or loss 
suffered. ' -
The five members of the Compensation Board are appointed by the 
Minister. The chairman of th is  Board must have certain  legal qualifica­
tions, but the legal chairman could be outvoted by the other members. I t  
may award compensation to any person who has suffered loss or injury for 
which he would have a claim but for the operation of the Act. However, 
the Board is not bound to award compensation. In i t s  inquiry i t  can take 
into account "such factors as i t  thinks f i t" .  Thus i t  is conceivable that 
i t  could decide that the claimant was not deserving of compensation at 
a l l  for proven in juries because, for instance, there is  some evidence that 
he was a sympathiser with the te rro ris ts  or had not rendered maximum co­
operation tq  the authorities. An in teresting question arises as to what 
the Board would do i f  i t  formulated a d ifferent opinion on the evidence 
of the nature of the action causing the injury as compared with the 
M inister's. What would happen i f  i t  decided that the action was not bond 
fide  or was not to suppress terrorism or to maintain public order? 
Presumably i t  would have to  decline to award compensation as i t  would 
lack ju risd iction  in  such circumstances. On the other hand the claimant 
would be precluded from approaching the ordinary courts.
As regards the procedures of the Board the rules of evidence'do not 
apply to i t s  proceedings. The claimant has no righ t to  argue his case 
before the Board or attend i ts  hearings. The board may choose to s i t  in 
sec re t. The Board is  not required to give any reasons for i ts  decision 
to the claimant or to the public or to anybody, except the Minister.
Again th is  is  the Minister who in many cases is the defendant in the 
action. The only appeal against the finding of the Board is  to the 
Minister, but the claimant is  not permitted to know the reasons of the 
Board for the decision. This makes i t  d iff ic u lt to set out in writing 
the fu ll reasons for ,the request for reconsideration-by the' Minister, as 
required by the Act. The appeal is  being made blindly as i t  were.
Any payment of compensation awarded by the Board,can be suspended 
whilst the person to whom the payment is  made is  imprisoned or detained, 
-but the Board can, i f  i t  thinks f i t ,  pay th is money to dependants during 
th is time.
When th is  leg isla tion  was introduced in Parliament Advocate 
Andersen, S.C., M.P., argued that the leg islation  was desirable for the 
avoidance of doubt,/but the indemnity which i t  would afford could well 
already ex ist under the common law. • In order for the common law position 
to pertain a s ta te  of actual war had to- be occurring. That a s ta te  of 
warfare did ex ist in the operational areas was admitted by the Government 
in th is  debate.11 I t  could thus be argued that the passing of this
P r i o r  to  t h i s  th e  Governm ent seem ed to  w an t t o  p la y  down th e  
w a r fa re  n a tu r e  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  For i n s ta n c e  S e n a to r  L a rd n e r-
11.
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leg isla tion  amounted to a disguised proclamation of martial law.
A number of d iff icu ltie s  arise with the application.of th is leg is­
lation. F irst and foremost i t  would seem that i f  the common law position 
is  such that a t the present time the ordinary courts lack jurisd iction  
to deal with cases of bona fide  wrongdoing arising out of m ilitary 
operations, the same would apply to mala fide  wrongdoing. Until the 
cessation o f h o s ti li t ie s  the courts would not have jurisd iction  to deal 
with any of the actions of the m ilitary e ither bona fide -or mala fide.
This would mean that the person who is  injured by mala fide  wrongdoing 
might find himself without a remedy as a resu lt of the indemnity leg is­
lation. The Government has said that the leg isla tion  d ifferen tiates 
between mala fide  and bona fide  action and those injured by mala fide 
action can s t i l l  pursue th e ir  claims before the ordinary courts. But 
i f  they did pursue th e ir  claims in  th is fashion they might be met with 
the rep ly  that the courts lack ju risd ic tion  because war is waging. 
Additionally they could not apply to the Compensation Board because i t  
fa lls  outside th e ir  terms of reference to award damages for mala fide 
injury. Conceivably i t  could be argued that th is leg islation  in fact 
granted to the courts ju risd iction  where under the cornnon law they had 
none. The leg islation  does not s ta te  th is , however.
Secondly in future anybody who has a claim of any kind against the 
Government for any wrongdoing w ill be uncertain as to whether to bring 
his claim in the courts or to apply to the Minister for compensation.
I f  he applies to  the Minister for compensation, the Compensation Board 
may turn down the application without giving any reasons. The claimant 
w ill not know whether th is was because i t  was a claim he should have 
brought in the courts because the actions which causedjiim injury were 
not done in good fa ith  or whether there was some other reason. I f  the 
claimant in s titu te s  proceedings in court, these may be terminated by a 
ce rtif ic a te  and the claimant may be completely ignorant that the actions 
he complains of were done in good fa ith . The claimant may well not know 
of the special facts known to the Government, nor is  the Government under, 
any duty to t e l l  him. I f  the Minister is  mistaken ot misled by some lie  
and issues a c e r tif ic a te , there is  no way the matter can be investigated 
by the courts and there is  no way the claimant could know of the fact.
Thirdly, and perhaps the most trenchant criticism , nowhere in the 
leg islation  are the key terms "in good fa ith" , "for the'purposes of or 
in connection with the suppression of terrorism or maintenance of public 
order” and "in  the national in terest"  defined. The Act lays down no 
indication of the lim its of the unlawful violence that may be perpetrated 
upon innocent people. The executive decides in i ts  own discretion
B urke sp e a k in g  in  th e  House in  S ep tem ber 1974 r e s i s t e d  s u g g e s t io n s  
t h a t  c a p tu re d  t e r r o r i s t s  sh o u ld  b e  sum m arily  e x e c u te d  in  th e  f i e l d  
a f t e r  b e in g  t r i e d  by k an g aro o  c o u r t s .  He s a i d  t h a t  t o  a llo w  t h i s  
w ould b e  t o  im p ly  t h a t  th e  c i v i l  pow ers had  l o s t  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  and t h a t  a  s t a t e  o f  m a r t i a l  law  was in  e f f e c t .
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whether the tests  la id  down in the Act are sa tisfied . Particularly 
disturbing is  the incorporation of indemnity for acts conmitted for the 
maintenance of public order. This c rite rio n  goes fa r beyond anything 
to do with terrorism  and is  very dangerously wide and was not debated or 
explained when the Act was introduced into the House. At no stage has 
the Government stated  publicly what i ts  policy w ill be in  the present 
circumstances regarding the definition of the lim its of unlawful violence 
upon innocent people. The ju risd iction  of the courts to  decide upon the 
lim its is  excluded, as is  th e ir  ju risd iction  to ensure that the tests  are 
properly applied. I t  is  of course well nigh impossible to give an 
accurate and comprehensive definition of these terms covering a ll  an tic i­
pated m ilitary situations. I t  should be observed, however,- that acts of 
atrocity  and extreme b ru ta lity  can be committed in perfectly good faith  
to suppress terrorism. For instance, a policeman could commit acts of 
sad istic  to rture upon a prisoner and could be acting in good fa ith  in 
order to extract what that policeman believes to be v ita l security 
information.. The point is  not so much that the leg islation  should have 
sought to define these tefms in an objective manner, but rather that i t  
is  disquieting that the interpretation and application of these provi­
sions should have been le f t  to the executive and not an independent 
tribunal. The executive is  intimately involved in the anti-insurgency 
campaign and must have a strong leaning in favour of vindicating the 
actions of the security forces. In effec t the executive is  a judge in 
i ts  own cause and th is contravenes the time-honoured principle entrenched 
in Western c iv iliza tio n , namely, nemo judex in suacausa. The contrast 
between the present leg islation  and other examples of indemnity leg isla ­
tion  is that almost without exception other Acts of Indemnity have been 
passed ex post facto, that is ,  a fte r the end of the war. Also almost 
invariably other Acts of Indemnity have not covered malicious acts. I t  
has thus been le f t  to the courts to decide what action was perpetrated 
bona fide  and what action' was mala fid e . 12
All th is  leads up to the question as to  whether the administration 
of th is leg islation  should not have been le f t  in the hands of the courts. 
Accepting for the moment tha t the leg isla tion  was desirable in so far as 
te rro r is t ac tiv ity  has occurred over a protracted period o f time and no 
end to the warfare is  in sight and thus that compensation awards could 
not be le f t  in  abeyance for an indefinite period, was i t  not possible 
for the leg islature when formulating th is Act to incorporate judicial 
processes? In the Rhodesian Parliament i t  was argued that m ilitary 
acts should not be judged in open court and that in any case c iv il  courts, 
even i f  informed as to the facts, would seldom be in  a position to 
determine the necessity or otherwise of a m ilitary a c t.12 3 To the f i r s t  
point i t  can be said that proceedings would not have to be in open court. 
There are more than ample provisions allowing proceedings to be held in 
camera. As regards the la t te r  point our courts have already had exten-
12 . See th e  l i s t  o f  such  p ie c e s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e f e r r e d  to  by th e  th e n  
M in is te r  o f  J u s t i c e  and  Law and  O rd er in  Hansard, 2 9 th  A ugust 1975, 
p p . 1 4 34-5 .
See Hansard, 2 8 th  A ugust 1975 , p .  1431.1 3 .
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siVe experience in dealing with the re a litie s  of m ilitary situations in 
te r ro r is t  cases. I t  is  inconceivable tha t they would adopt anything 
other than a re a lis tic  and pragmatic approach in regard to injuries 
caused to civ ilians during the conduct of m ilitary  operations. Even 
before the advent of th is leg islation  the courts would have dismissed 
unfounded claims with costs, which would have tended to discourage 
vexatious litig a tio n . Additionally i f ,  as appears to have been the 
case, the main purpose of th is  leg islation  was to prevent the harassment 
and denigration of the security forces in  court actions, was i t  not 
possible to pass criminal provisions to  punish severely persons or 
organizations found to have brought claims not to pursue genuine grie­
vances, but only to undermine the security forces? Prior to the leg is ­
lation  the courts would, i t  is  submitted, have displayed pragmatism in 
dealing with such c iv ilian  claims. Civilians can only be injured in 
one of three ways - namely, accidentally, negligently or w ilfully and 
maliciously. The f i r s t  type of injury would not have been actionable 
(although presumably the Government would have offered ex gratia payment 
of compensation in such cases, as i t  has done in certain  cases recently). 
The courts would obviously have, applied the concept of negligence res­
tr ic tiv e  ly taking into account fie ld  conditions, the need for urgent 
action, e tc . I t  would seem that to leave the courts the decision as 
to whether there was negligence (applied very re stric tiv e ly ) or malice 
would be preferable to  leaving to the executive a very broad and vague 
discretion to decide whether the action was performed in good faith .
The area covered by the courts would be only a l i t t l e  broader than that 
le f t  to them by the Act,'where they would have ju risd ic tion  to deal with 
matters of mala fide  wrongdoing. Under the leg isla tion  i t  is  feared in 
certain  quarters that the term "in good faith" could be interpreted so 
widely by the executive as to leave no room for court actions on the 
basis of mala fide  wrongdoing. This i t  is  hoped is  a completely 
unfounded fear, but there is  absolutely no independent check upon the 
in terpretation of the executive of such matters.
At very least i t  seems tha t there is  absolutely no valid reason 
why the High Court could not deal with the question of quantum of damages 
arising out o f  the application of the Act. At the stage a t which a 
M inisterial c e rtifica te  is  issued the Government is  admitting tha t the 
acts or omissions causing the in juries did take place but are ruling 
tha t they were done in good fa ith . In the matter of compensation, 
therefore, a l l  that presumably has to be decided upon is what constitutes 
a fa ir  award given the nature and extent of the in ju ries. Under the 
terms of reference of the Compensation Board, however, there is nothing 
to indicate in what circumstances or in what amount such compensation 
might be awarded. Justice should be manifest in the matter of compen­
sation. The claimant should .have the right to appear to s ta te  his case 
i f  he wishes and proceedings should be in public except for evidence o’f 
assistance to the te rro r is ts . Such approach is  essential for the . . 
furtherance of the "hearts and minds" campaign. An independent court 
should deal with these matters rather than an administrative tribunal 
selected by the Government. , '
By way of closing the following should be borne in mind:
"In no respect can martial law be regarded as a good thing; - i t
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is  a t best a lamentable necessity. I t  imposes a great responsi­
b i l i ty  upon the executive Government; i t  operates with inevitable 
harshness in certain  cases, and i t  saps the p o litica l fibre of the 
people." Per Innes C.J. in Krohn v. The Minister o f  Defence,
1915 A.D. 191, 202. ‘
I t  is  suggested that Parliament should thus not be quick to pass 
indemnity leg isla tion , particu larly  during a s ta te  of war. Without 
i t  a t lea s t th*ere w ill be a  check on extremes of conduct as the m ilitary 
conmanders w ill remain apprehensive of what acts w ill be condoned la te r . 
I t  is  to be hoped tha t as soon as is  possible the fu ll effec t of the 
normal processes of the law w ill be regained.
"Mr. In terpreter, what is  the problem?"
"My Lord, the accused is  asking irrelevant questions." 
" I t  is  my function to decide whether or not questions 
are irre levant. What is  the accused saying?"
"The accused wishes to  know where your Lordship bought 
the fine red blanket you are wearing."
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